Altruistic maximizers face a frustrating dilemma when there is an infinite series of ever-better options, but no best choice.

Andrew Bernstein replies to Kirsti Minsaas' review of his Cliffs-Notes to Anthem, The Fountainhead, and Atlas Shrugged (Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Fall 2001). He defends the literary and philosophical merit of the works.

Cliff Landesman provides a vivid description of a case where we have no best outcome available to us. He poses this as a problem for utilitarians who advise us to do the best we can. This does indeed make such advice impractical. I begin by contrasting older versions of utilitarianism with newer ones that have appeared in deontic logic and that were designed precisely to accommodate Landesman's sort of scenario. (I cast matters in terms of the Limit (...) Assumption and world-theoretic versions of utilitarianism.) I then make three points. First, Landesman's problem does not pose any special problem for these newer theories. Secondly, I note that it is an interesting consequence of these newer theories being utilitarian theories, that--contrary to the tradition--utilitarianism isn't automatically a no conflicts theory of obligation. Thirdly, and most importantly, I identify a new, deeper and wider theoretical problem: "The Confinement Problem". This problem infests the newer versions of utilitarianism. Worse still, the infestation spreads to satisficing consequentialism (cf. Scheffler, Slote), the direction Landesman points to for a solution to his problem, and this new problem is one where the theoretical rulings of these theories clearly conflict with intuition. (shrink)

Despite being there from the beginning, philosophical approaches have never had a settled place in cognitive research and few cognitive researchers not trained in philosophy have a clear sense of what its role has been or should be. We distinguish philosophy in cognitive research and philosophy of cognitive research. Concerning philosophy in cognitive research, after exploring some standard reactions to this work by nonphilosophers, we will pay particular attention to the methods that philosophers use. Being neither experimental nor computational, they (...) can leave others bewildered. Thought experiments are the most striking example but not the only one. Concerning philosophy of cognitive research, we will pay particular attention to its power to generate and test normative claims, claims about what should and should not be done. (shrink)

Observing averted eye gaze results in the automatic allocation of attention to the gazed-at location. The role of the orientation of the face that produces the gaze cue was investigated. The eyes in the face could look left or right in a head-centred frame, but the face itself could be oriented 90 degrees clockwise or anticlockwise such that the eyes were gazing up or down. Significant cueing effects to targets presented to the left or right of the screen were found (...) in these head orientation conditions. This suggests that attention was directed to the side to which the eyes would have been looking towards, had the face been presented upright. This finding provides evidence that head orientation can affect gaze following, even when the head orientation alone is not a social cue. It also shows that the mechanism responsible for the allocation of attention following a gaze cue can be influenced by intrinsic object-based (i.e. head-centred) properties of the task-irrelevant cue. (shrink)

In their controversial paper ‘After-birth abortion’, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that there is no rational basis for allowing abortion but prohibiting infanticide (‘after-birth abortion’). We ought in all consistency either to allow both or prohibit both. This paper rejects their claim, arguing that much-neglected considerations in philosophical discussions of this issue are capable of explaining why we currently permit abortion in some circumstances, while prohibiting infanticide.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 415-431 [Access article in PDF] The Humanities at Home with Themselves Mark Bauerlein The Crafty Reader, by Robert Scholes; 272 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, $24.95. WHEN I STARTED GRADUATE SCHOOL in English in the early Eight ies, a typical thing happened. Those few students with a background in philosophy drifted together, shared influences, and developed a hierarchy of critical works. A (...) few pushed analytic philosophy and pragmatism, but overall Continental theory took first place, especially Derrida. "Structure, Sign, and Play" and "White Mythology," de Man's "Rhetoric of Temporality," Shoshana Felman's "Turning the Screw of Interpretation," and other weighty essays had the status of cutting-edge wisdom, and the hostility deconstruction drew from traditionalists and Marxists in the department only sharpened our commitment. Having no other professional standing, we savored the stigma, the roguishness. It complemented our poverty, and eased our transition from hot-shot undergraduates to first-year, prequalifying Ph.D aspirants. In the evenings, after instructing freshmen in comma splices, we gathered to trade Nietszchean epigrams and mock professors who looked befuddled at the mention of a priori and aporia.Other students found us insufferable, and doubtless we were, but not in a partisan way. We panned each other just as hard as we did the uninformed. This was UCLA, not Yale or Johns Hopkins, and personalities mattered less than arguments. If in discussion I backed a point with [End Page 415] "As Derrida says...," someone always answered, "So what?" We frowned on arguments from authority. Popularizations such as Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction earned our scorn. They were one step up from Cliff's Notes, packed with servile observations like "Jean Baudrillard wants to take us further, into a world where everything is so textualized that there is no space left for the real." We preferred to understand deconstruction through laborious readings of Being and Time and Beyond Good and Evil, not in watery effusions about textuality or the mechanical pairing of binary oppositions. The latter we placed among the scribes, those well-intentioned professionals canny enough to recognize the broad import of deconstruction, but not acute enough to discern the real meaning of différance or the radical disclosure of the ontic-ontological difference. The genius of philosophy, we thought, lay in plumbing the fundamental habits of cognition, like Hegel breaking down sense certainty and Heidegger questioning the determination of Being as substance. Exegesis of other texts was a lesser activity, though we acknowledged exceptions such as Starobinski's book on Rousseau and Kojève's lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit.Lower in our rankings were the quasi-Leftist attacks just emerging, such as Frank Lentricchia's Criticism and Social Change, which cast theorists as mandarin functionaries treating interpretation as an apolitical game. They filled the page with spiteful terms like "the mask of pure reason" and righteous declarations like "it is wrong to claim that you are above politics," spurning argument for the rhetoric of the reformer. We diagnosed them as puny reactions to the Reagan Revolution, carried out on the irrelevant ground of literary theory. Philosophically, Lentricchia was a hack, and we rejected the imputation that theory nullified activism and justified the status quo. Not that we thought theory bred activism. We just considered them separate activities, and saw no determinate connection between hermeneutical stance and party affiliation. However, we accepted the elitist charge. How could ambitious academics avoid elitism? It wasn't hard for graduate students struggling on $900 a month to see that populist attitudes didn't suit the tenured Ivy Leaguer. Professors were paid by exclusive institutions to teach poetry, to write letters for the best and brightest, to run recondite journals and jet to prestigious symposia. We wanted to join them, but not with phony expressions of social injustice that targeted theory as the problem.Allied with the political attacks on theory, and esteemed even lower, were critiques of the humanities as a bastion of high culture. Polemics [End Page 416] such as Andrew Ross's No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture treated... (shrink)

Modern theory needs a history lesson. Neither Marx nor Nietzsche first gave us theory—Hegel did. To support this contention, Andrew Cole’s _The Birth of Theory_ presents a refreshingly clear and lively account of the origins and legacy of Hegel’s dialectic as theory. Cole explains how Hegel boldly broke from modern philosophy when he adopted medieval dialectical habits of thought to fashion his own dialectic. While his contemporaries rejected premodern dialectic as outdated dogma, Hegel embraced both its emphasis on language (...) as thought and its fascination with the categories of identity and difference, creating what we now recognize as theory, distinct from systematic philosophy. Not content merely to change philosophy, Hegel also used this dialectic to expose the persistent archaism of modern life itself, Cole shows, establishing a method of social analysis that has influenced everyone from Marx and the nineteenth-century Hegelians, to Nietzsche and Bakhtin, all the way to Deleuze and Jameson. By uncovering these theoretical filiations across time, _The Birth of Theory_ will not only change the way we read Hegel, but also the way we think about the histories of theory. With chapters that powerfully reanimate the overly familiar topics of ideology, commodity fetishism, and political economy, along with a groundbreaking reinterpretation of Hegel’s famous master/slave dialectic, _The Birth of Theory_ places the disciplines of philosophy, literature, and history in conversation with one another in an unprecedented way. Daring to reconcile the sworn enemies of Hegelianism and Deleuzianism, this timely book will revitalize dialectics for the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Decoherence results from the dissipative interaction between a quantum system and its environment. As the system and environment become entangled, the reduced density operator describing the system "decoheres" into a mixture (with the interference terms damped out). This formal result prompts some to exclaim that the measurement problem is solved. I will scrutinize this claim by examining how modal and relative-state interpretations can use decoherence. Although decoherence cannot rescue these interpretations from general metaphysical difficulties, decoherence may help these interpretations to (...) pick out a preferred basis. I will explore whether decoherence solves nagging technical problems associated with selecting a preferred basis. (shrink)

Are the characteristics and relationships among spatio-temporal entities "real" or are they simply conventional terms that note similarities among things in the world but lack any reality of their own? Or if they are real, what sort of reality do they have? Do we live in a world of causes and effects, or is this relation a useful contrivance for our convenience? What is the nature of this "I" that we invoke when referring to ourselves? Is it body? Mind? Both? (...) Neither? And once its nature is understood, what can be said of the choices it makes? Are they really ours, freely made by an independent will? Or is each choice determined more by the internal makeup of the "I" we happen to be and the social/environmental circumstances in which this "I" finds itself, rather than by any act of will? But if each of us "could not have chosen otherwise" than we have, are we no better than the machines we construct? Then again, maybe some of our more advanced machines should be considered conscious entities? Introduction to Metaphysics: The Fundamental Questions presents these and other intriguing questions, many of which have challenged philosophers from antiquity to the present in their efforts to speculate on the nature of what is real. Often filled with twists and turns, dark corners and hidden recesses, this journey of discovery is an exciting excursion into the depths of human understanding. As guides for this intellectual journey editor Andrew Schoedinger has chosen an impressive array of creative and thought-provoking philosophers: Peter Abelard, Aristotle, Renford Bambrough, George Berkeley, Joseph Butler, Rudolf Carnap, Roderick Chisholm, R.G. Collingwood, Arthur Danto, Donald Davidson, Rene Descartes, C.J. Ducasse, Alvin I. Goldman, Keith Gunderson, David Hume, John Locke, Alasdair MacIntyre, A.I. Melden, John Stuart Mill, D.F. Pears, Hilary Putnam, Anthony Quinton, Bertrand Russell, Michael Scriven, Sydney Shoemaker, P. F. Strawson, Richard Taylor, and others. This volume is a unique invitation to join a distinguished group of theorists as they tackle tough questions concerning the existence of universals, the nature of causation, understanding personal identity, the tangled web of free will, and the challenges posed by the advent of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This article argues that lawyers are not doing enough to eradicate the needless differences in terminology used, and the substantive inconsistencies, between common law and equity. In developing this argument, three categories within English private law are recognized. First, where common law and equity co‐exist coherently, and where the historical labels of common law and equity remain useful terminology. Second, where common law and equity co‐exist coherently but there is nothing to be gained by adherence to those labels which could, (...) and should, be excised at a stroke. And third, where common law and equity do not co‐exist coherently and a change in the law, albeit often only a small change, is needed to produce a principled product. As a general illustration of what the third category comprises, and what fusion requires, one wide‐ranging and practically very important area within the third category is focused on, namely monetary remedies for civil wrongs. (shrink)

Of all the crew to serve on a starship Enterprise, none has had such a convoluted line of existence as the venerable Mr. Spock. This chapter explores what the various incarnations of Mr. Spock can tell us about the nature of reality, existence, and personal identity. Lewis argues for the metaphysical theory of modal realism: all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. In science fiction parlance, this philosophical concept of world is more often called a universe. Thus, (...) Earth and Vulcan are both part of the same world depicted in Star Trek. The central question Lewis addresses is whether our world is the only real world, or whether other possible worlds could also be considered real. Lewis argues for the metaphysical theory of modal realism, all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. (shrink)

Originally published: Philadelphia: Saunders College Pub., c1990.

The growth factor progranulin (PGRN) regulates cell division, survival, and migration. PGRN is an extracellular glycoprotein bearing multiple copies of the cysteine‐rich granulin motif. With PGRN family members in plants and slime mold, it represents one of the most ancient of the extracellular regulatory proteins still extant in modern animals. PRGN has multiple biological roles. It contributes to the regulation of early embryogenesis, to adult tissue repair and inflammation. Elevated PGRN levels often occur in cancers, and PGRN immunotherapy inhibits the (...) growth of hepatic cancer xenografts in mice. Recent studies have demonstrated roles for PGRN in neurobiology. An autosomal dominant mutation in GRN, the gene for PGRN, leads to neuronal atrophy in the frontal and temporal lobes, resulting in the disease frontotemporal lobar dementia. In this review we will discuss current knowledge of the multifaceted biology of PGRN. (shrink)

New Zealand's health (and disability) ethics committees are children of public inquiries: the ‘Cartwright’ ministerial inquiry of 1988, the ‘Gisborne’ cervical screening ministerial inquiry of 2001, and the Health Select Committee clinical trials inquiry of 2011. The Cartwright inquiry strengthened external scrutiny of research. The Gisborne Inquiry strengthened ethics committee accountability and expertise, and greatly streamlined review process. The Health Select Committee inquiry is further sharpening accountability and process. Under-discussed systemic issues also persist, including: how to keep the ethical primacy (...) of the researcher-participant relationship and of researcher responsibility for good study conduct; whether the point of ethics committees is to facilitate good research as well as to protect participants; and whether ethics committees are just standard public bodies - to be given powers and limitations just like any other administrative tribunal or licensing board. (shrink)

In the aftermath of the ‘Brexit’ referendum two pieces of campaign material used by the successful Leave campaign proved controversial: a slogan on the side of a bus fallaciously implying that leaving the EU would necessarily free up £350 million a week for the NHS; and a poster stating that Britain was at “Breaking Point” – purportedly due to an influx of migrants – that was redolent of Nazi propaganda. This paper analyses and develops some criticisms that were levelled at (...) the Leave campaigners who authorised these from the perspective of political liberalism. It concludes that those behind the Breaking Point poster could justifiably have been subject to non-criminal sanction by institutions such as the Electoral Commission, but that this is not the case for the NHS bus. The Breaking Point poster warrants sanction because it belongs to a category of hateful speech that propagates false and discriminatory beliefs about its targets. Where these are disseminated by those in authority or of high status, such as political campaigns, they can strengthen these beliefs amongst the rest of the population. This can lead to members of the targeted group being unable to deliberate effectively as they are not treated with adequate respect in political discussions, which in turn undermines the process of public justification. As a result, it undermines public justification in a way that false factual claims do not, eventhough in this case the NHS slogan appears to have had a greater effect on the referendum result. (shrink)

As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to (...) split the difference between Dworkin’s view and more traditional views, concluding that Dworkin’s work in Justice for Hedgehogs contributes to metaethics for everyone.Resumen:En palabras de Dworkin “el escepticismo moral es una concepción moral”; esto en contraste con la idea más popular de que el verdadero reto para el realismo moral es el escepticismo externo, un escepticismo que proviene de consideraciones no morales sobre la metafísica de la moral. Al igual que otros no comparto las conclusiones más poderosas de Dworkin acerca de la viabilidad del escepticismo externo; sin embargo, considero que su crítica de un “escepticismo equivocado” aporta una muy útil enmienda a los proyectos de metaética más tradicionales. Mi objetivo en este ensayo es separar las diferencias entre la perspectiva de Dworkin y las perspectivas tradicionales, para al final concluir que el trabajo de Dworkin, en Justice for Hedgehogs, contribuye a una metaética para todos. (shrink)

Before the start of the COViD-19 global pandemic, I stumbled across Bryan Hall’s book ‘an ethical guidebook to the zombie apocalypse’. I was instantly drawn to the ‘zombiefied’ image of Rodin’s the Thinker on the cover, and so I made an impulsive purchase on a rainy day. On my return home, I filed it unread on my bookshelf where it lay undiscovered - until the lockdown came. Stories began to emerge of a changing world, a growing sense of pandemic panic (...) and a readjustment to a new world and a new way of life - and I remembered my zombie book. With time on my hands, I began to read - and the echoes between the zombie apocalypse and COViD-19 grew more vivid and more real. It became harder to tell truth from fiction as I read of a virus that was spreading around the world, causing society to implode, law and order to breakdown and a sense of right and wrong to be blurred. So, on our return to school, after our lockdown, I was inspired to use the zombie apocalypse as my tool to inspire my year 10 Philosophy elective class – most of whom were just beginning their Philosophy studies. (shrink)

Guy Austin _Claude Chabrol_ Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999 ISBN 0 7190 5271 8 (hb); 0 7190 5272 6 (pb) 197 pp.

This article investigates the issue of secondary school pupils asking questions. This is an important topic on which very little has been published to date. The article reviews the current literature, which almost exclusively reports the lack of student initiated, content related questioning in classrooms. A small study is described that challenges this view, finding a significantly greater level of student participation, a high percentage of inquiry driven questions and little reluctance on the part of pupils to participate actively in (...) lessons. However, when these questioning patterns, which appear to indicate exemplary lessons on paper, are examined in terms of pupil learning, it is found that large numbers of student questions can lead to severe disruption unless adequately controlled. For effective learning to take place, it is a vital that the learner has the opportunity to ask questions of the teacher. The vast bulk of the literature explores this topic through quantitative analysis of questioning patterns and suggested strategies for increasing the quality and frequency of pupil?s questions. This article reviews this research and explores the issue further through classroom observations, pupil questionnaires and interviews with teachers. The findings are compared with the current paradigm and the issue is discussed in terms of impact on pupil learning. (shrink)

Programmed cell death (PCD) in unicellular organisms is in some instances an altruistic trait. When the beneficiaries are clones or close kin, kin selection theory may be used to explain the evolution of the trait, and when the trait evolves in groups of distantly related individuals, group or multilevel selection theory is invoked. In mixed microbial communities, the benefits are also available to unrelated taxa. But the evolutionary ecology of PCD in communities is poorly understood. Few hypotheses have been offered (...) concerning the community role of PCD despite its far-reaching effects. The hypothesis we consider here is that PCD is a black queen. The Black Queen Hypothesis (BQH) outlines how public goods arising from a leaky function are exploited by other taxa in the community. Black Queen (BQ) traits are essential for community survival, but only some members bear the cost of possessing them, while others lose the trait In addition, BQ traits have been defined in terms of adaptive gene loss, and it is unknown whether this has occurred for PCD. Our conclusion is that PCD fulfils the two most important criteria of a BQ (leakiness and costliness), but that more empirical data are needed for assessing the remaining two criteria. In addition, we hold that for viewing PCD as a BQ, the original BQH needs to include social traits. Thus, despite some empirical and conceptual shortcomings, the BQH provides a helpful avenue for investigating PCD in microbial communities. (shrink)

Event synopsis: This conference will explore Friedrich Nietzsche's critical relation to Kantian political philosophy. Taking 'Kantian politics' to include modern and contemporary Kantian theories as well as Kant's own theories, the conference will examine Nietzsche's engagement with such Kantian themes as autonomy and rights, equality and democracy, morality and politics, war and cosmopolitanism, history and anthropology. The speakers are renowned scholars of political philosophy from the United States and Europe, and the format of the conferences involves the pre-circulation of papers (...) among participants and extended sessions, so as to allow much time for discussion. The conference is the sixth in a series examining Nietzsche's relation to Kant and Kantianism, each focusing on specific areas and texts of Kant's philosophy. Previous conferences were held on ethics in Leiden, aesthetics in London, epistemology in Lisbon, religion in Belo Horizonte, and anthropology in Lecce, and another will be held on the transcendental in Galway in March 2014. The conference is organized by Tom Bailey ([email protected]) and funded by John Cabot University. There is no conference fee, but if you plan to attend, please register with Tom Bailey, who will also provide you with practical information and the conference papers. All sessions will take place at the University's Guarini campus, in Via della Lungara 233, Trastevere, Rome. The Friday morning sessions will take place in the Aula Magna Regina, and the following sessions in the Board Room. (shrink)

In recent years, and especially in the wake of Barack Obama's reelection, projections that whites will soon become a minority have proliferated. In this essay, I will argue that such predictions are misleading at best, as they rest on questionable philosophical presuppositions, including the presupposition that racial concepts like ‘whiteness’ are static and unchanging rather than fluid and continually being reconstructed. If I am right about these fundamental inaccuracies, one must wonder why the myth of the white minority persists. I (...) will argue that by reenvisioning whites as a minority culture struggling against a hostile dominant group, and by promoting white solidarity as a response to a crisis, such predictions actually serve to defend and legitimize white supremacy. (shrink)